March 16, 2023 Update: We have a revised version: SR 15-18 vs SR 15-19 vs HCR – Spero Risk Associates, which describes the current application of the guidance by the four tiers, i.e., I, II, III, and IV. We plan to further refine the new post as our time permits.
January 31, 2017 Update: The Fed released its final rule yesterday, and we will update our analysis when the opportunity presents. However, our general caution is that when the final results are numbers, it can be difficult to separate the qualitative from the quantitative; so, be careful. It is our understanding that many DFAST institutions, which aren’t subject to either SR 15-18 or SR 15-19, face similar governance and model governance related findings as CCAR banks. So, again, when the output is quantitative, it’s hard to argue that an input or process is qualitative and irrelevant.

1. CCAR Supervisory Expectations for Complex and Non-complex Banks

How We Categorize the Differences

Our view is that SR 15-18 reaffirms guidance for SR 15-18 banks, and SR 15-19 mostly codifies existing differences between the giant and the large banks–rather than necessarily weakening expectations for SR 15-19 banks. Moreover, based upon our reading, as well as June, 2016, comments by Daniel Tarullo, we anticipate that bank regulators will offset any easing of supervisory oversight of CCAR and capital planning with increased vigilance and scrutiny during routine exams and reviews, e.g., greater scrutiny of SR 12-7 compliance related to comprehensive stress testing.1

Overall, we see the differences between SR 15-18 and SR 15-19 falling into one of four categories. (Note that these Roman numeral categories are unrelated to the Tier categories that the Fed later introduced for large banks by size; it is just a coincidence we both used the numerals.)

Category Description
I. Codification Codification or formalization of existing differences in treatment; CCAR expectations for the largest banks were already greater than for many of the regionals.
II. Relaxation Actual relaxation or loosening of standards for the smaller CCAR banks.
III. Shifted Scrutiny Scrutiny shifted to other, non-CCAR regulatory reviews for items that are not required “in its capital planning process,” e.g., SR 12-7, which applies to every bank with more than $10B in assets.
IV. Guidance Gap Guidance (with a capital “G“) versus small “g” guidance: SR 15-19 eliminates certain explicit and specific requirements for the non-complex firms, but leaves a void. It provides no official “Guidance” of its own. For those cases, the surest and most economical way to reduce regulatory uncertainty and comply with SR 15-19 may be to follow the guidance for–the additional details provided to–large and complex banks in SR 15-18.
I. Codification
Codification or formalization of existing differences in treatment; CCAR expectations for the largest banks were already greater than for many of the regionals.
II. Relaxation
Actual relaxation or loosening of standards for the smaller CCAR banks.
III. Shifted Scrutiny
Scrutiny shifted to other, non-CCAR regulatory reviews for items that are not required “in its capital planning process,” e.g., SR 12-7, which applies to every bank with more than $10B in assets.
IV. Guidance Gap
Guidance (with a capital “G“) versus small “g” guidance: SR 15-19 eliminates certain explicit and specific requirements for the non-complex firms, but leaves a void. It provides no official “Guidance” of its own. For those cases, the surest and most economical way to reduce regulatory uncertainty and comply with SR 15-19 may be to follow the guidance for–the additional details provided to–large and complex banks in SR 15-18.

In the tabs below, we review each section and appendix of both documents, and our conclusion is that the Fed’s requirements haven’t changed, much. The message to the 15-19 banks remains the same: get the big stuff right. To do that, understand your portfolios, risks and risk drivers. In addition, understand how your models and other approaches capture those risks and possible losses. Be prepared to justify your approaches, and be prepared to justify claims of immateriality. If you have questions or concerns, contact us or call 1-205-423-5668. Our expert team of former risk executives will be happy to advise you.

Background

In 2015, Republicans, led by Richard Shelby (AL), the chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, attempted to raise the CCAR threshold to $500B from $50B, while it seemed that the Federal Reserve was willing to accept a modest increase. Many observers believed that an increase would be part of overall budget compromise, but it was not.

Shortly after the budget compromise in December, 2015, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew stated that Dodd-Frank provided regulators with the flexibility to tailor oversight to an institution’s size. Towards the end of an interview with Bloomberg TV the Secretary stated that $500B institutions are enormous–some of the largest financial institutions in the world. He then added that $150B – $250B institutions are almost as enormous, with the implication being both sets of institutions required oversight.

The day after the budget vote, the Federal Reserve released SR 15-18 and SR 15-19, which divided CCAR requirements between (1) large and complex firms with total consolidated assets greater than $250B, and (2) large and non-complex firms with total consolidated assets between $50B and $250B. It is tempting to view SR 15-19 as a regulatory work-around or substitute to increasing the CCAR threshold, especially, since its publication was the DAY AFTER political efforts to raise the threshold failed.